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What Is an Employee? Why It Does,
But Should Not, Matter
Marc Linder*
For the state to intervene to make more just and equal the rel-
ative strategic advantages of the two parties to the contract, of
whom one is under the pressure of absolute want, while the
other is not, is as proper a legislative function as that it should
neutralize the relative advantages arising from fraudulent cun-
ning or from superior physical force. At one time the law did
not try to equalize the advantages of fraud, but we have gener-
ally come to concede that the exercise of such mental superior-
ity as fraud indicates, has no social value, but the opposite. It
may well be that the uncontrolled exercise of the advantages
derived from possessing the means of living of other men will
also become recognized as giving no social benefit correspond-
ing to the evils which result. If so, there is no ground for leav-
ing it uncontrolled in the hands of individuals.1
I. Introduction
Reappraisal of the employee-employer relationship has be-
come a theoretical desideratum. Thousands of employers are re-
classifying their employees as self-employed entrepreneurs in
order to avoid employment taxes.2 A United States federal ap-
peals court has held unskilled, uneducated, impoverished and capi-
tal-less Mexican-American migrant farmworkers hand-picking
cucumbers to be independent contractors ("share-farmers") 3
rather than employees. Thus, they are not within the coverage of
federal statutes4 meant to protect such workers from kinds and
* Attorney, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Farmworker Division. B.A., University of
Chicago (1966); M.A. (1971), Ph.D., Princeton University (1973); J.D., Harvard Uni-
versity (1983). Jim Pope, Rutgers-Newark School of Law, and Julius Sensat, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, incisively criticized earlier versions.
1. Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 Harv. L.
Rev. 495, 506 (1908).
2. See Marc Linder and Larry Norton, The Employee-as-Contractor Dodge, The
Philadelphia Inquirer, June 15, 1987, at 15A; Marc Linder and Larry Norton, The
Latest in Employer Scams, The Texas Observer, Aug. 28, 1987, at 12.
3. See also Sachs v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio, W.D. 1976)
(migrant cucumber pickers are share farmers for the purposes of federal employ-
ment taxes and not employees).
4. Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1984) (migrant farmworkers
who contracted to harvest farmer's crop are not employees within meaning of Fair
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levels of exploitation and abuse otherwise unknown in the late-
twentieth-century United States.5 Even some Marxist class ana-
lysts hasten to concur that such "proletarians are being trans-
formed into petty commodity producers."6
Such a re-examination must be undertaken historically be-
cause the categories of "employee" and "employment relationship"
lie at the crux of what distinguishes capitalist societies from their
predecessors.7
We look back over two centuries in which wage labor has won
freedom and self-respect, and are astonished . . . at the
prejudices of those who were reluctant to enter the factories;
men and women then looked back over two centuries and
more of rejection of the slavery of wage labor .... of small
proprietorship, of an agricultural holding to ward off starva-
tion in unemployment, sickness and old age.8
Although wage labor in fourteenth and fifteenth-century
England connoted freedom when contrasted to the prior condition
of serfdom, it also signaled a loss of independence. The expropria-
tion of the land or "capital" which accompanied the change under-
mined this anti-feudal emancipatory meaning.9
This two-fold sense of "freedom" comprising wage labor still
survives. Wage laborers are both formally free to work when,
Labor Standards Act), reh g denied, 760 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1985). But see Secretary
of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding such cucumber pickers
to be employees), cert denied, 57 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1988) (No. 87-1853).
5. In a similar vein, a federal district court has held that non-English speaking,
unskilled Vietnamese backers, peelers, and pickers in crabmeat plants whose 'capi-
tal investment' consists of hairnet, apron, gloves and a rudimentary knife are in-
dependent contractors because they "commonly serve more than one facility in a
single day"--depending on which plant is supplied with fish that day. Donovan v.
Seafood, Inc., No. 84-1684 "L," slip op. at 7,4 and 8 (W.D. La. July 13, 1987), rev'd
sub nom. McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 861 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1988).
6. John Wilson, The Political Economy of Contract Farming, Rev. Radical Pol.
Econ., Winter 1986, at 56. Wilson relies on Wells, who has reproduced this claim in
several formats. See Miriam J. Wells, The Resurgence of Sharecropping: Historical
Anomaly or Political Strategy? 90 Am. J. Soc. 1 (1984); Miriam J. Wells, What is a
Worker? The Role of Sharecroppers in Contemporary Class Structure, 13 Pol. &
Soc. 295 (1984); Legal Conflict and Class Structure: The Independent Contractor-
Employee Controversy in California Agriculture, 21 Law & Soc. Rev. 49 (1987).
7. Historically-oriented studies are not subject to the criticism that exclusive
attention to the unchanging private-law contract of employment obscures the cru-
cial functions performed by public-law employment obligations (such as the Statute
of Labourers and Poor Laws) and the auxiliary institutions created to enforce
them. See Michael Tigar and Madeleine Levy, Law and the Rise of Capitalism 307-
08 (1977). It is, doubtful, however, whether even Karl Renner, whom Tigar and
Levy were criticizing, neglected these changing social contexts.
8. Christopher Hill, Pottage for Freeborn Englishmen: Attitudes to Wage La-
bour in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in Socialism, Capitalism, and Eco-
nomic Growth 338, 350 (C.H. Feinstein ed. 1972).
9. See id. at 341; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individ-
ualism 148-51 (1979 [1962]).
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where and for whom they please, and substantively free from the
direct access to the means of production and subsistence that once
undergirded the independence of small producers. While the
wage-earners in capitalist societies have at times displayed the mil-
itancy and autonomy befitting the liberating component of the
first meaning, they have also succumbed to their role as the depen-
dent creatures of capital contained in the second meaning.10 Work-
ers promote an ideological view of the state as an agency that can
be manipulated to create the modicum of social security and work-
related protection that, at least for certain sectors of the working
class, cannot be gained directly from their capitalist employers."
Fostering this view, workers have come to believe in an image of
themselves as passive beneficiaries of forces that operate outside of
the employer-employee relationship.12
Paradoxically, entitlements to those benefits are almost uni-
versally contingent on being an employee,' 3 rather than being self-
employed.14 The variety of benefits and protections in the United
10. On the original continental European equivalence of the social question and
the labor question in the sense of aiding a disadvantaged group, see Zacher, Ver-
rechtlichung im Bereich des Sozialrechts, in Verrechtlichung von Wirtschaft,
Arbeit und sozialer SolidaritM, 14, 15-18 (Friedrich Kubler ed. 1985).
11. These remarks are not intended as a glorification of the "voluntarism" or
anti-political orientation of the craft unions in the American Federation of Labor,
which prior to the New Deal rejected protections conferred by the State on work-
ers who were unable to secure them through direct economic action vis-,-vis their
employers. For a concise account of voluntarism, see Grant McConnell, Private
Power and American Democracy 79-86, 319-29 (1970)). The use of formally demo-
cratic legislative procedures to negotiate old-age pensions, unemployment compen-
sation, etc., could theoretically make the division of income between labor and
capital globally transparent by removing it from its subjection to the spontaneous
needs of capital accumulation. In the United States, however, this political debate
has been dulled by virtue of being couched in terms of class-neutral personal in-
come tax brackets, rather than in terms of capital and labor shares.
12. Of the English trade union movement at the turn of the century it has been
said that it was engaged in the anomalous, impossible and hence transitional effort
to use collective civil rights to assert basic social rights:
Rights are not a proper matter for bargaining. To have to bargain for
a living wage in a society which accepts the living wage as a social
right is as absurd as to have to haggle for a vote in a society which ac-
cepts the vote as a political right. Yet the early twentieth century at-
tempted to make sense of this absurdity. It fully endorsed collective
bargaining as a normal and peaceful market operation, while recogniz-
ing in principle the right of the citizen to a minimum standard of civi-
lized living[.]
T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship,
and Social Development 116 (1963).
13. Approximately nine-tenths of current government social expenditures in
the United States are tied to the existence of an employment relationship. See in-
fra note 121.
14. In the wake of mass unemployment in Western Europe in the 1980s and the
stronger entrenchment of labor unions, European discussion of the need to un-
couple the so-called social wage from the existence of an employment relationship
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States conditioned on the existence of an employment relationship
is impressive:' 5 unemployment compensation, workers compensa-
tion, collective bargaining rights, minimum wages and maximum
hours, social security,16 pensions, occupational safety and health,
and anti-discrimination protection.' 7 What an employee is, how-
ever, has often been left vague, has varied from benefit program to
benefit program and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and has
changed over time. No sound theoretical or empirical ground justi-
fies this lack of uniformity. Indeed, the very existence of this
hodgepodge is largely unknown not only to the affected workers,
but also to the legislators, administrators and judges who are re-
sponsible for articulating policies, formulating definitions and
drawing lines.18
Two historical questions are raised here. First, whether this
crazy-quilt pattern of irrational and unreflective bases of coverage
ever made sense in the past. Second, whether the stage of capital-
ist transformation of the economy and society that has been at-
tained in capitalist countries has now made the distinction between
wage-earners or employees and independent contractors or the
self-employed, obsolete.
has centered on unemployment, rather than self-employment, as the chief barrier
to access to a living wage. See, e.g., Thomas Schmid, Befreiung von falscher Arbeit
(1984); Claus Offe et al., "Arbeitsgesellschaft": Strukturprobleme mid Zukunftsper-
spektiven 355-58 (1984); Oskar Negt, Lebendige Arbeit, enteignete Zeit 215-17
(1987). Twenty years earlier, the specter of unprecedented unemployment brought
about by the cybernetic revolution and automation gave rise to a proposal for a ba-
sic guaranteed income in the United States. See, e.g., The Guaranteed Income
(Robert Theobald ed. 1967).
15. Although the scope of state intervention has been considerably expanded
since the New Deal, even at the high point of Victorian contractarianism, capital-
labor relations were regulated not only by punitive, anti-union, master-servant rela-
tions acts, but also by labor-protective regimes such as the truck (or anti-company
store) acts. Only from the radically ahistorical perspective of Law and Economics
doctrine could it seem that: "During the nineteenth century, the area of labor rela-
tions was governed by a set of rules that spanned the law of property, contract, tort,
and procedure. There was no special set of rules for labor cases as such." Epstein,
A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation,
92 Yale L. J. 1357, 1357 (1983). For a broad, international analysis, see Simitis, "Zur
Verrechtlichung der Arbeitsbeziehungen," in Verrechtlichung von Wirtschaft,
Arbeit und sozialer Solidaritat 73 (Friedrich Kubler ed. 1985).
16. In 1950 the self-employed began to be incorporated into the social security
programs. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Ch. 809, § 104(a), 64 Stat. 492
(1950) (amending Social Security Act of 1935 [adding § 211]).
17. For citations of the employee definition/coverage provisions in the pertinent
statutes, see Marc Linder, The Involuntary Conversion of Employees into SeVf-Em-
ployed: The Internal Revenue Service and Section 530, 22 Clearinghouse Rev. 14
(1988). In addition to workers compensation statutes, numerous state laws are also
keyed to employment.
18. For a prominent exception, which, nevertheless perpetuates the tradition,
see E.E.O.C. v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 35-36 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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II. The Political-Economic and Juridical Concepts of the Distinction
between Wage Workers and Independent Commodity
Producers
One leading judicial advocate of the beneficial effects of con-
tractual arrangements and free markets has noted that, regardless
of the economic impact such state intervention as the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) exerts, its purpose is clearly to protect
"workers ... selling nothing but their labor. They have no physi-
cal capital and little human capital to vend. [T]hose to whom the
FLSA applies must include workers who possess only dedication,
honesty, and good health."19 In this eminently practical context, is
there any categorical difference between one who sells---and has
nothing else to sell but-his labor power,20 and one who contracts
to sell the product of his labor?21 Looked at from another perspec-
tive: what distinguishes a worker who depends on fluctuations in
the labor market from one whose livelihood hinges on the changes
in the non-labor commodity market?22
19. Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1545 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easter-
brook J., concurring). Given the hostility of the Law and Economics school to such
schemes as a mandatory minimum wage, it is plausible that Judge Easterbrook's
bold and judicially unprecedented proposed per se rule that all migrant
farmworkers be "employees" for the purpose of FLSA, flows from a strategy calcu-
lated to promote "the amending process." Id. That is to say, the repeal of the
FLSA. On the incipient judicial version of the Law and Economics critique of mini-
mum wage laws, see Mechmet v. Four Seasons Hotels, 825 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir.
1987) (per Posner, J.). The continuity with classical political economy may be
gleaned from the review provided by Lionel Robbins, The Theory of Economic Pol-
icy in English Classical Political Economy 104-05 (1952).
20. Highly skilled workers may also have nothing but their labor power to sell.
Although in principle FLSA also covers and protects such workers, the empirical
association of high skill, small supply and high wages with superior bargaining
power makes it clear that they were not the primary objects of state intervention
into the labor market (at least with respect to the minimum wage provisions of the
Act). At the outer limit of a supply-demand structure favorable to skilled workers,
the coercive dependence inherent in the employment relationship may be tempo-
rarily tendentially sublated. See Marc Linder, Employees, Not-So-Independent Con-
tractors, and the Case of Migrant Farmworkers: A Challenge to the "Law and
Economics" Agency Doctrine, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. of L. & Soc. Change 435 (1987). It
must be kept in mind that FLSA excludes from coverage a number of segments of
the skilled-namely mental workers with professional training. 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 541.3 and §§ 541.301-541.315.
21. For an historical illustration of the transition from the latter to the former,
see Marie Rowland, Masters and Men in the West Midland Metalware Trades
before the Industrial Revolution 157-58 (1975).
22. Employees are not shielded from the risks inherent in the markets for the
commodities they produce for their employers; rather, such risks are mediated-
with a time-lag. Thus, for example, the workers who produced Edsels presumably
lost their jobs rather than invested capital. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia 255 (1974), overlooks this connection. It may be true, however, that the ne-
cessity of valorizing significant fixed capital investment may compel employers to
postpone dismissals beyond the point at which less encumbered employers would
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Assuming the existence of capital-endowed and/or skilled
workers, some of whom are wage workers and others independent
commodity producers: what distinguishes them? More to the
point: what distinguishes their respective relationships to the enti-
ties for which they work?23 Does the fact one is committed to the
realm of command and the other to that of exchange, mean that in
one the capitalist is the active element and in the other the passive
element? Alternatively, given that such a worker can be an em-
ployee, an independent commodity producer, or merely "on the
payroll," i.e., partake of the formal status of the employee while
substantively remaining outside of the dominion of capital, how
can these various relationships be distinguished?24
The origins of the distinction between wage workers and in-
dependent commodity producers cannot be situated on the abstract
level of the mere division of labor. The socio-economic and polit-
ical roots of this fundamental divide drive too deeply into the pre-
history of European capitalist societies to take seriously the claim
that:
since it is obvious that, in the complicated intercourse of mod-
em society, a great proportion of the business of human life
must be carried on through the instrumentality of others, and
is also clear that slavery does not now exist, in any shape in
England... it seems to follow inevitably ... that the relation-
ship of master and servant must exist .... 25
A major obstacle to understanding the distinction is that the
two categories are not rigidly dichotomous.26 The amorphous
have already costlessly reduced their payrolls. For speculation on how these con-
siderations played themselves out in the context of the eighteenth-century putting-
out system, see M. Dorothy George, England in Transition: Life and Work in the
Eighteenth Century 52-53 (1965).
23. Strictly speaking the purchase by capital of the labor services of an in-
dependent contractor would figure as expenditure on constant capital (or indirect
labor?). See Herbert Gintis and Samuel Bowles, Structure and Practice in the La-
bor Theory of Value, Rev. Radical Pol. t9con., Winter 1981, at 1, 23 n.34.
24. For extensive case citations adducing various fact patterns, see Annot., 19
A.L.R. 1168 (1922) ("Circumstances under which the existence of the relationship
of employer and independent contractor is predicable.").
25. Charles Manley Smith, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Workman
XXV (1852). Without warrant, Smith cites Pufendorf, De Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. 6,
cap. 3, sect. 4, as authority for the claim concerning the inevitability of the master-
servant relationship. Similarly unfounded is the claim that: "In the 1840s and the
1850s men were not aware of reasons why there ought to be legal differences be-
tween the status of the workmen and the status of their masters." Vernon Miller,
The Master-Servant Concept and Judge-Made Law, 1 Loyola L. Rev. 25, 28 (1941).
26. The ambiguity may be more acute at historical turning points than with re-
spect to the present-day survival of antediluvian forms of labor. Thus, the fact that
journeymen (outside of the building trades) in New York City in the early years of
the nineteenth century were paid by the piece according to a list of just prices has
been called "evidence that artisan wage labor was not yet fully regarded as a mar-
[Vol. 7:155
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borderlines owe their existence to the fact that small independent
commodity producers constitute an unstable hybrid class con-
stantly being pulled towards dissolution in the direction of
proletarianization or competitively viable capital accumulation:
"Small masters are neither real proletarians, since they partially
live on the labor of the apprentices, and sell not labor but the fin-
ished product, nor real bourgeois, since it is still in the main their
own labor that maintains them."27 In light of the opportunities for
self-exploitation available to the self-employed that are legally
foreclosed to employees2s the "independence" of independent com-
modity producers can and does become so illusory as to render
them de facto proletarians.2 9
Some of the ambiguity attaching to the boundary between
wage workers and independent contractors derives from the indi-
vidualistic perspective of both orthodox economic theory and juris-
prudence. 30 If the labor exchange process,31 which is responsible
for ordering the alignment of workers along one side of that divide
or the other, instead is viewed as a phenomenon of compulsory in-
corporation into a system of social class, the task of line-drawing
may become more categorical.
ket commodity, as labor power .... Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York
City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 at 28 (1984).
27. Friedrich Engels, Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England, in: 1:4 Marx
Engels Gesamtausgabe 190 (1932 [1845]) (translation by author). The present dis-
cussion abstracts from the issue of working small employers who may both exploit
and be exploited. Beyond a critical threshold (indicated by the number of employ-
ees) such self-employed are employers in their own right; below that threshold
their status approximates that of their employees. The issue was raised by nine-
teenth-century English courts in interpreting the Truck Act.
28. In addition to workweeks reminiscent of the long hours that prevailed in
early nineteenth-century mills, the self-employed also have access to the exploita-
tion of family members, especially children.
29. In some eighteenth-century English trades "the skill and the capital re-
quired were so small that it was said that every man was his own master, though
the earnings of such a master might be below those of an unskilled labourer." M.
Dorothy George, London Life in the Eighteenth Century 157 (1964).
30. It is odd to see such a magisterial historian as E.P. Thompson write of the
transition from half-free forms of labor into free, mobile wage labor in the eight-
eenth century: "But crops could not be harvested, cloth could not be manufactured,
goods could not be transported, houses could not be built and parks enlarged, with-
out labor readily available and mobile, for whom it would be inconvenient or im-
possible to accept the reciprocities of the master-servant relationship." E.P.
Thompson, Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture, 7 J. Social Hist. 382, 383 (1974).
31. On the blurring of the distinction between labor and labor power in neo-
classical economics-see Herbert Gintis, The Nature of Labor Exchange and the
Theory of Capitalist Production, Rev. Radical Pol. Econ., Summer 1976, at 36, 42.
Subsequently, Gintis accused Marx of undercutting his critique of liberalism and
being indistinguishable from new-classical economics by virtue of his failure to un-
derstand that labor power is not a commodity, nor labor its use value. See Herbert
Gintis and Bowles, supra note 23, Winter 1981, at 1.
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A worker is compelled to become and remain a wage laborer
because she lacks access to the means of production that would
permit her to become a small independent commodity producer.32
In other words, class-determined poverty and lack of "capital"3 3
separate wage laborers from independent commodity producers.
Alternatively, the possession of a scarce marketable skill might
also function as a definitional marker. These skills cannot be
costlessly acquired,34 but can be remuneratively used to produce
tangible commodities or intangible services without the ownership
of capital.35
Ownership of significant capital is a less ambiguous indicator
of independence than skill is in at least one sense. A skilled profes-
sional-such as a lawyer or physician or even a plumber-may be
"on the payroll" of an employer without any pretense that the em-
ployer can substantively subordinate these employees in any
greater degree than if they provided the same services as "outside
contractors." The employer may choose to secure such skilled per-
sons' full-time exclusive services that are tangential to the profit-
making core of the business for convenience. It is much less plau-
sible that one with substantial physical capital would be so em-
ployed.3 6 Someone who enters a firm with her own specialized
means of production would become a partner rather than an em-
ployee. In this way, she would be able to shield herself from the
32. "Quiconque veut vendre des marchandises distinctes de sa propre force de
travail dolt naturellement poss6der des moyens de production tels que mati~res
premi~res, outils, etc." 1 Karl Marx, Le Capital 131 (tr. Roy 1969).
33. The ownership of capital may not relieve small entrepreneurs of the need
to sell their labor power but in fact may place additional pressure on them to do so
by imposing on them the necessity of amortizing their capital, i.e. working longer
hours in order to generate the revenues to finance the purchase of capital equip-
ment. For a good example (namely, a small masonry subcontractor) of this two-
fold structure, see William Reddy, Money and Liberty in Modern Europe 99 (1987).
Claus Offe, "Arbeitsgesellschaft": Strukturprobleme und Zukunftsperspektiven 62
(1984), overlooks this circumstance in his labor market typology.
34. The costs of acquiring such a skill in the representative case include forgo-
ing current compensation, which in turn preslpposes postive savings or access to
others' (typically relatives') savings. With the expansion of commercial mass en-
tertainment it has become possible for actors and singers to secure large incomes
for the display of skills that arguably were not acquired in the aforementioned
manner. See Allan Dodds Frank & Jason Zweig, The Fault is not in Our Stars,
Forbes, Sept. 21, 1987, at 120, 126.
35. In terms of self-consciousness, one aspect of this distinction has been poign-
antly captured as follows: "'For all that, a chap 'at's learnt his trade an' can use his
hands---he isn't a machine an' he isn't a flippin' monkey-he's a man, lad, wages or
no wages, a man.'" J.B. Priestley, The Good Companions 630 (1929).
36. This claim abstracts from such aberrant examples as the owner of a busi-
ness who, upon selling it to a still larger entity, joins the merged organization as a
corporate executive, manager or supervisor.
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heteronomy associated with the employee status.3 7
Historically, before the rise of large-scale mechanized capital-
ist industry, skilled artisans owned and used their own modest
means of production to produce tangible commodities for an anon-
ymous market. This constituted the chief form of non-agricultural
autonomous labor. Commodity producers could attain a degree of
relative independence depending on how hard a particular branch
of production or occupation was pressed by burgeoning capitalist
forms of production. The distinction between these quasi-in-
dependent skilled artisans and wage laborers was not difficult to
draw.3 8 The intermediate situations, however, created, and con-
tinue to create, confusion.3 9 With the decline of independent com-
modity producers and the concomitant proliferation of manually
skilled service-providers operating in the interstices of capitalist
enterprises, it is not surprising that the bulk of real-world legal
disputes involve skilled service-providers.
In order to avoid conflating the distinct categories of (capital-
endowed and skilled) independent commodity producers4o and
(skilled but less capital-endowed) service-providers, the two will
be analyzed separately.
A. Independent Commodity Producers
A non-employing worker who makes tables or jewelry and
sells them to the public from a store (or on the street) is unam-
biguously an independent commodity producer; by uniting the
processes of production and distribution in one hand, he consoli-
dates his autonomy. Artisans who also sell directly to the public
have become a rarity, but indisputably they are not employees of
their myriad anonymous customers. Relationships become some-
37. A major exception is truck drivers owning their own equipment. Such ar-
rangements by means of which employers fragment, disperse and shift the risk as-
sociated with large capital investment onto their drivers while retaining control
over the market for transportation of goods resemble those obtaining under the
early capitalist putting-out system. See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1988, at 29, col. 1 (nat.
ed.).
38. Once industrialization took hold of the British economy in the nineteenth
century, however, artisans became so proletarianized that the term "artisan" itself
came to mean "wage worker." Eric Hobsbawm, Workers 254 (1984).
39. Gintis, supra note 31, at 36, 43, acknowledges the existence of such a contin-
uum, but the example he chooses to illustrate the "clearly specifiable conditions
under which the employer-employee relationship shades off into the 'independent
agent' relationship" is the supply of female labor to a company typing pool. This
example is hardly calculated to promote categorical or situation-sensitive line-
drawing.
40. Although independent, they are no more "contractors" vis-a-vis their cus-
tomers than is a railway vis-a-vis its passengers. In other words, independent con-
tractors constitute a sub-set of the self-employed.
1989]
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what less clear where the artisan customizes the product for the
individual buyer, for example, a tailor in a clothing store. Even
more ambiguous is the relationship where production is not only
individualized, but also takes place on premises owned by the con-
sumer-the most common modern example being house
construction.
A useful typology 4l for classifying these relationships in
terms of proximity to the final consumer commodity market (in
descending order of independence) can be adapted from Max
Weber42 :
1. Preiswerker: Small entrepreneurs producing inventory to
be sold directly to the anonymous final consumer market.
Have disposition over raw materials and tools.
2. Artisans producing for the bespoke trade:
a. Have disposition over raw materials and tools:
i. Sell directly to consumers;
ii. Verlegte Preiswerker
(Artisan-Outworkers): Produce to order for an en-
trepreneur, who monopolizes their labor power;43
b. Kundenlohnwerker (custom wage workers): Cus-
tomer furnishes raw materials and perhaps tools.
3. Hausindustriell verlegte Lohnwerker (Capitalist-Outwork
Wage Workers): Consumer is entrepreneur.44
4. Inside Contractors: Skilled workers in machinery and
metals plants to whom capitalists provide space, machin-
ery, materials and delegate responsibility for production
and hiring in exchange for piece rate.4 5
41. The schematic classification is not intended to reflect a unilinear historical
sequence. For a concise historical outline, see George Unwin, Industrial Organiza-
tion in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 10-13 (1957).
42. Max Weber, Wirtschaftsgeschichte 112-13 (1923). See also Karl Bucher, In-
dustrial Evolution 150-84 (3d ed. 1968).
43. Historically, such monopolization often resulted from artisans' lack of ac-
cess to the export trade or from their indebtedness to entrepreneurs. See Maxine
Berg, The Age of Manufacture: Industry, Innovation and Work in Britain 1700-
1820, at 280 (1985). For a factually disputed modern example involving carpenters
working for a home building company, see Trustees of Sabine Area Carpenters'
Health & Welfare Fund v. Lightfoot Home Builder, 704 F.2d 822, 826-27 (5th Cir.
1983).
44. See, e.g., Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick & Jiirgen Schlumbohin et al., Indus-
trialisierung vor der Industrialisierung 194-232, 272-92 (1977); Robert Millward, The
Emergence of Wage Labor in Early Modern England, 18 Explorations in Econ. Hist.
21 (1981); S. Bindoff, Tudor England 124-25 (1950).
45. See Carter Goodrich, The Frontier of Control 120 (1921); Buttrick, The In-
side Contract System, 12 J. Econ. Hist. 205 (1952); Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of
Modern Management 38-47 (1965); Daniel Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins
of the New Factory System in the United States 1880-1920, at 36-38 (1975); Dan
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5. Wage Laborers: In manufactory or factory attached to
capitalist's capital.46
This typology expresses historical stages in the growth of in-
dustrial-capital control over immediate producers.47 The transi-
tions from artisan outworkers to capitalist outwork wage
workers,48 and from inside contractors to capitalist wage workers49
were essentially characterized, if not driven, by efforts to subject
the immediate producers to greater centralized control. This is
true regardless of whether attainment of that control was the sole
subjective purpose and objective reason for the ultimate
supremacy of industrial-capitalist hierarchical methods of organiz-
ing production.50 Nevertheless, the advanced state of subordina-
tion achieved, for example, on the modern assembly line, should
not obscure the forms and substance of dependence that prevailed
in earlier stages.5 1 More indirect forms of control could still un-
dermine the autonomy of an independent commodity producer suf-
Clawson, Bureaucracy and the Labor Process: The Transformation of U.S. Industry,
1960-1920, at 71-125 (1980); Englander, The Inside Contract System of Production
and Organization, 28 Labor History 429 (1987). On the related phenomenon of the
so-called butty system in coal mining, see Pollard, supra at 41-42; Raphael Samuel,
Mineral Workers, in Miners, Quarrymen and Saltworkers 1, 48-50, 62, 73 (Raphael
Samuel ed. 1977); Carter Goodrich, The Miner's Freedom (1925).
46. See, e.g., Paul Mantoux, La Revolution Industrielle au xviii' siacle.
47. In his rich historical study of management, Pollard remarks that sub-con-
tracting was not a stage, but rather, compatible with various stages of industrial
capitalism. Only the dogmatism of nineteenth-century classical political economy,
Pollard concludes, led to the view that the capitalist-entrepreneur-owner facing an
individual, property-less worker is the normal, highest, finite form of organization.
Pollard, supra note 45, at 39. Apart from the anti-teleological implications of Pol-
lard's criticism, it is questionable whether his strictures apply to any of the other
types mentioned in the text. For an extended argument that "the existence of
technologically advanced forms of work presupposes the continued existence of
archaic forms and vice versa," see Charles Sabel, Work and Politics 11 passim
(1982), and Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide 19-48
(1984).
48. Although this transition is crucial to the socio-epistemology offered by Al-
fred Sohn-Rethel, by merely denominating the stages as "Lieferungsverhiltnis"
and "Arbeitsverhiltnis" Sonn-Rethel does not explain the transition. See Alfred
Sohn-Rethel, Soziologische Theorie der Erkenntnis 99 (1985).
49. On the massive and systematic use of sub-contracting in the peculiar form
of labor sweating and sub-letting-"bastard artisan industry"-see Sean Wilentz,
Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class,
1788-1850, at 113 (1984).
50. As asserted by Marglin, What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of
Hierarchy in Capitalist Production, Rev. Radical Pol. Econ., Summer 1974, at 60.
But see David Landes, What Do Bosses Really Do?, 46 J. Econ. Hist. 585 (1986).
51. For case studies of the process in various trades during different periods in
the United States and England, see M. Dorothy George, London Life in the Eight-
eenth Century 155-213 (1964); Alan Dowley, Class and Community: The Industrial
Revolution in Lynn, 11-96 (1979); I.J. Prothero, Artisans and Politics in Early Nine-
teenth-Century London 22-50, 332-40 (1979); Wilentz, supra note 49, at 107-42.
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ficiently to bring her within the orbit of another entity. Thus, the
transaction between a merchant and a capitalist outworker work-
ing on raw materials owned by the merchant pursuant to a piece
rate on a simple machine which is owned by the worker should be
characterized not as a market exchange (that is, an exchange of
entitlements), but rather, as part of a system which closely resem-
bles production within a firm.52 Despite the absence of direct su-
pervision,53 such workers could be subjected to discipline not much
inferior to that of a factory master.54
Whatever independence such capitalist outworkers were able
to retain rested on their continued ownership of some component
of the means of production that was located outside the sphere of
domination of the capitalist-merchant. But did retaining this asset
act as a buffer to shield the worker against incursions into his
sphere of domination? In the eighteenth century, "[h]istorians
might find it useful to describe such men where they depended on
working for a capitalist 'putting-out' employer as a 'dependent ar-
tisanry', but contemporaries would not have needed the qualifying
adjective."55 Moreover, the line was blurred between such depen-
dent artisans working on a piece rate and wage-earning or sub-con-
tracting small masters, because both might have been working for
the same merchant capitalist who supplied materials to other
workers.56
Just as the Verlagssystem involved a method of compensating
for a low degree of integration and centralization that permitted
merchants to gain control of production, inside contracting repre-
sented an attempt to attack indirectly the problem of inadequate
control that existed in certain kinds of factories when their size in-
creased in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.57 As such, in-
side contracting spanned a period of transition from the tool-
builder's requiring someone who could furnish capital, to the capi-
talist's requiring someone who could manufacture a product that
52. Millward, supra note 44, at 24.
53. Such monitoring would have required centralization of production, which
was inhibited by the cost of attracting labor from its rural base. Id. at 37.
54. Id. at 32. Moreover, industrial craftsmen under the industrial putting-out
system "were as economically dependent on their employers as were wage
labourers, and their employment was less continuous." Christopher Hill, The Cen-
tury of Revolution 1603-1714 at 206 (4th ed. 1963).
55. John Rule, The Experience of Labour in Eighteenth Century Industry 22
(1981).
56. Id. at 32-36; 2 C.G.A. Clay, Economic Expansion and Social Change: England
1500-1700, at 11, 94-97 (1984). For a discussion of the isomorphism between labor
markets and credit markets, see John Roemer, A General Theory of Exploitation
and Class 93-95 (1982).
57. Pollard, supra note 45, at 38.
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he could sell. 8 For example, in certain metals manufacturing in-
dustries59 the firms provided space, machinery, materials, working
capital, as well as managed sales, while the inside contractors were
delegated responsibility for production of certain parts of the
firm's output, including labor. Since their income equalled the dif-
ference between their wage bill and their "sales" to the com-
pany,6 0 inside contractors presumably had incentive to engage in
"sweating" their laborers. 61 The Winchester Repeating Arms
Company used this system at the turn of the twentieth century.
The capitalist owner had neither mechanical training nor ability,
so he was forced to enter into a "partnership" with a master
mechanic.6 2 Once the hybrid entity was operating, however, the
capitalist, as a functional character mask of his capital, was like-
wise forced to enhance his control vis-&-vis the inside contractor's
"private knowledge of production methods."63 Capital's success in
gaining control of the relevant technology and enforcing its own
direct supervision was in large part a function of the increasing
complexity of manufacturing. This rendered inside contractors
less innovative because the requisite knowledge was no longer the
arcane lore of practitioners, but publicly transmitted scientific
knowledge that could be acquired only through specialized
training.64
Late-nineteenth-century appellate court decisions in tort ac-
tions brought by the employees of inside contractors against a mill
or factory reflected the ambiguity inherent in the status of inside
contractors.65 In a case involving a spike mill, the Pennsylvania
58. Buttrick, supra note 45, at 221.
59. Tin mills, brass works, rolling mills, iron smelting and blast furnaces were
among the affected industries in addition to cotton spinning. Pollard, supra note
45, at 42-47.
60. Buttrick, supra note 45, at 205, 206.
61. This circumstance conflicts with the romantic-communitarian image of in-
side contracting that pervades the description offered by Michael Piore and Charles
Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide 33 (1984). On the role played by the sweating
and sub-letting of labor in obscuring the overall structure of class relations, see 1
Karl Marx, Das Kapital, ch. 21 (1867). Further confusion of class roles could have
resulted from the fact that in some instances inside contractors also received day
pay as employees that exceeded their "profit." See Buttrick, supra note 45, at 206,
209.
62. Buttrick, supra note 45, at 207.
63. Id. at 210.
64. Id. at 214-15.
65. With one exception, the reported cases involve actions by employees of in-
side contractors against the capitalist employer. This would be significant if it re-
flected the consciousness of such contractors that they were not employees and
hence could not take advantage of protective statutes. People v. Remington, 45
Hun. 329 (App. Div. 1887), qff'd, 109 N.Y. 631, 16 N.E. 680 (1888), was brought
under an 1885 New York statute preferring the wages of operatives and laborers in
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Supreme Court held that whether the plaintiff-worker was in the
company's employ directly, or indirectly as assistant to the roller
boss, he could be treated as the company's employee because he
was engaged in its work, upon its machinery, and in the mill it op-
erated.66 In contrast, the Indiana Supreme Court abstracted from
all production-related contexts, and instead, hinged its finding that
the injured plaintiff-worker was not the servant of the defendant-
rolling mill solely on the ground that the company was not liable
for his wages in the absence of an express or implied contract. The
inside contractor, who was a "heater," was furnished scrap iron to
be put into a furnace which was furnished and fueled by the com-
pany. The court deemed the heater an independent contractor, in
spite of the fact that the mill superintendent both was responsible
for insuring that the heaters fulfilled their contracts by properly
performing a certain amount of work each day, and had the power
to discharge them if they refused to discharge a helper whom the
superintendent considered derelict.6 7
Analysis of the historical transformations of autonomy for
what were once independent commodity producers turns out to be
conceptually and empirically much more staightforward than that
of skilled service-providers. Because the latter operate on the
fringes and in the interstices of employing entities, the seemingly
tangential quality of these relationships creates an appearance of
dissociation or separateness which requires further-reaching criti-
cal exploration.
corporate bankruptcy proceedings. The defendant corporation had furnished the
petitioners with stock, rooms and machinery to manufacture parts of machines for
which the corporation agreed to pay a fixed price; these persons in turn employed
their own laborers. The opinion contains no further discussion of the actual work-
ing conditions, making it difficult to assess the claim. Unfortunately, although the
headnote states that the petitioners were not covered, the opinion itself is confined
to citing long passages from other cases, in particular ones decided under the Brit-
ish Truck Act. See also People v. Remington, 6 N.Y.S. 796 (Sup. Ct. 1889) (decided
on basis of earlier case).
66. Rummell v. Dillworth, Porter & Co., 111 Pa. 343, 346-47 2 A. 355, 357 (1886).
Without explaining how it arrived at the conclusion, the court added that, since it
did not appear that the roller boss was an independent contractor, it was not impor-
tant that his compensation was calculated by reference to the number of tons man-
ufactured. Id. See also Indiana Iron Co. v. Cray, 48 N.E. 803 (Ind. App. 1897) (steel
mill worker was company's employee and boss roller-who was in effect foreman,
though he had sole control of the manner of manufacturing and could hire and
fire-was not independent contractor where company also had the latter
authority).
67. New Albany Forge & Rolling-Mill v. Cooper, 131 Ind. 363, 364-65, 30 N.E.
294, 295-96 (1892).
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B. Skilled Service-Providers
In order to avoid the pitfalls inherent in the consumer-as-em-
ployer relationship, the "pure" case of a skilled manual worker
with some modest investment in specialized physical capital assets
who sells his services to a capitalist entity may be adduced-for ex-
ample, a plumber.68 An automobile factory may employ a mainte-
nance plumber or engage one from time to time as needed. This
example is poorly chosen in the sense that this particular capital is
not geared to exploit this plumber. A better example would be a
skilled production worker, but such workers are attached to huge
capital investments not their own, and so their dependence is inev-
itable. Thus, the example would be appropriate only where no
capital investment were required of either party-in other words,
where no representative capitalist firm were involved.
The fact that automobile manufacturing capital does not self-
valorize by exploiting plumbers employed or under contract to
maintain the urinals, is merely another way of saying that such
plumbers are not integrated into the core production of that entity.
The lack of such integration may also be equivalent to a lack of
control by the entity. This structure applies to the payroll
plumber as well as to the independent contractor.
The degree of vertical integration a firm has achieved can
only be analyzed concretely. For instance, the reason why Ford in-
augurated its own steel production while General Motors
purchased its steel from producers cannot be sufficiently explained
on the level of "capital in general." Regardless of the reasons, the
structure of GM's commercial relations with United States Steel or
Bethlehem Steel will differ qualitatively from those with the
68. As producers of tangible commodities, who are easier to distinguish, have
receded in socio-economic significance in favor of those who sell services--an ex-
change considerably more difficult to distinguish from the sale of labor power-a
putative employer seeking to avoid even the appearance of an employment rela-
tionship may be tempted to transmogrify a service relationship into the sale-
purchase of a commodity.
Thus laborers are employed to empty a carload of coal. The employer
insists that he does not control them, that he did not hire their "serv-
ices" but only contracted for the "result," an empty car. The means of
unloading, he says, are their own, i.e., they can shovel right-handed or
left-handed, start at one end of the car or the other.
[.. The employer, under the spur of tax or other liability, solemnly
recites to him a legal jingle: "I no longer control you. Shovel according
to your own methods. I hold you responsible only for the ultimate re-
sult, a pile of coal. You render me no shoveling services, but you
rather sell me a product: a pile of coal from an emptied car."
Powell v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 345 Mich. 455, 472, 479, 75 N.W.
2d 874, 883, 886 (1956) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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outside solo practice plumber.69
Since this fundamental difference occurs in the absence of
control by GM over the actual production process engaged in by
either the steel producer or the plumber, the distinction must lie
elsewhere. It could be explained either by the unequal positions
the latter two occupy in the macro-economic wage-price-profit ma-
trix (which would be reflected in all their economic relations) or
in their specific degree of economic dependence or independence
vis-a-vis GM. With the exception of a few extraordinary skills that
have not been routinized and hence, are transitionally monopo-
lized, a kind of economic dependence arises for the "independent"
contractor. The substance of independent contracting is thus ne-
gated when a manual worker uses little capital equipment or when
the disparity in the size of his capital vis-A-vis that of his con-
tractee exceeds a certain critical threshold.70
According to one critical interpretation of the neo-classical
economic view of the distinction between employees and independ-
ent contractors, 71 the essence of the employment relationship lies
in the employee's relinquishing to the employer complete disposi-
tion over his activities subject to agreed-upon limitations.72 But, so
the objection runs, this kind of relationship in which a perfected
agreement between the parties resolves the question of who has
power over whom, in fact characterizes independent contracting
rather than employment:
Clearly, the neo-classical assumption can be extended to
hiring the services of an independent agent. If hired, the agent
contracts to supply a particular service for a price. Failure to
provide the service entitles the user to withhold payment, and
perhaps also sue for damages. The contract is guaranteed by
an external political power (the judicial system) and the ex-
change can be treated symmetrically with other market
transactions.
The essence of these various market exchanges is a le-
69. This will be true even abstracting from the possibility that the automobile
manufacturer contracts with, rather than employs, a plumber because the sporadic
nature of the work would not justify full-time employment.
70. For a mathematical proof of how, given unequal organic compositions of
capital, market exchange generates the division of non-employing self-employed
producers into exploiters and exploited, see Roemer, supra note 56, at 123-32; Roe-
mer, New Directions in the Marxian Theory of Exploitation and Class, in Analyti-
cal Marxism 81, 84-90 (J. Roemer ed. 1985).
71. See, e.g., Herbert Simon, A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship,
19 Econometrica 293 (1951); Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior, 123-53 (2d ed.
1957 [1945]).
72. For a penetrating analysis of the dialectic inhering in the struggle over con-
verting that contractual disposition into effective control at the point of production,
see David Brody, Workers in Industrial America, 188-210 (1980).
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gally enforceable quid pro quo. Not so in the case of wage la-
bor, where in return for a wage (quid), the worker normally
offers only to submit to the political authority of the firm.
When a specific quo is in the form of labor services, the indi-
vidual is an independent agent, not a wage laborer.73
In other words, where the labor task is completely specified con-
tractually, and the contracting party is paid for that task regard-
less of the time required to perform it, that worker would,
according to this interpretation, be an independent contractor.
Conversely, compensation for time worked abstracted from the
amount of work performed, demarcates a wage laborer.74
This categorization is not in itself a sufficient criterion. For
instance, a client paying a lawyer in solo practice $250 per hour,
when the lawyer has dozens of such clients, does not transform the
lawyer into a wage worker. In the sphere of material production, a
plumber or mechanic can illustrate the same principle. If the
owner of a house wishes to contract with the plumber to repair a
drain, the plumber may certainly charge by the hour. The same
would apply to an automobile mechanic. In either case, the
worker would not be considered a wage worker rather than an in-
dependent contractor, even though the other party may have spec-
ified the precise task to be accomplished. To be sure, the buyer of
the services may not have specified the methods to be used or su-
pervised the execution. But the reasons for that failure or inabil-
ity do not lie in the forms of the contracts into which the parties
entered or the forms of compensation. Those forms can be
adapted to a variety of socio-economic relationships.
73. Gintis, supra note 31, at 36, 41-42.
74. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism: Property,
Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought 76 (1987). Samuel
Bowles, The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-
Hobbesian, and Marxian Models, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 16, 21 n.9 (1985), has extended
this categorical definition of wage workers to piece rates with one significant
modification:
[E]ven the use of straight piece-rate payments will not render costs in-
dependent of the hours of labor hired unless the piece-rate workers
use no inputs owned by the firm, and the determination of the
number of pieces produced requires no surveillance inputs and hence
is costless. But in this extreme case, there is no reason-by conven-
tional definitions-to consider the piece-rate workers part of the firm
that purchases their output, for their sole relationship to the firm is an
exchange.
Where, however, the firm monopolizes the piece-rate workers' labor power, the in-
dependence that creates the basis for selling commodities distinct from their labor
power may be undermined. This conclusion would apply not only to the historical
Verlagssystem but-with due attention to the more complicated matrix of prices,
wages and profits---also to modern sub-contractors who produce exclusively for one




Instead, the ability of the "employer" to specify the work
methods and to control the worker's performance is rooted in the
relative assets and skills that each of the parties brings into the re-
lationship. If the "employer" not only owns all the machinery and
materials that the worker must use, but also understands them
and how to use them better than the worker does, then the worker
is dependent on the employer, while the reverse is not true.
Where, as in the case of the plumber or mechanic, the worker
owns and skillfully operates the equipment while his contractee
could not, the latter is a customer (not an employer) and the for-
mer an independent contractor (not a wage worker).75
Even this analysis does not extend far enough, however. As
the historical case of outworkers using their own equipment
demonstrated, even ownership of equipment located in the private
sphere of the worker may not have rescued them from relegation
to wage-labor status. In other words, actual subordination of labor
to capital within the process of production is not a necessary condi-
tion of dependent labor. Even in contemporary capitalist societies,
in which such subordination does unambiguously function as a suf-
ficient condition of labor dependency, large numbers of workers
who are not subject to such physical domination are nevertheless
economically dependent on firms.
III. Current Legal Tests of the Employment Relationship: Personal
Control versus Economic Dependence
Two rival tests of the employment relationship have devel-
oped over time: the more restrictive control test and the more ex-
pansive economic reality of dependence test. Both approaches
have venerable progenitors. Control is rooted in pre-capitalist
75. Exclusive reliance on the disciplinary functions of "monetary exchange
asymmetries" in abstraction from the substance of employer-employee relations has
caused one author to extinguish the societal significance of the distinction between
an employer and a customer. See William Reddy, Money and Liberty in Modern
Europe: A Critique of Historical Understanding, ch.3 (1987). By focusing on trans-
actions in which the rich gained power over the poor by virtue of the fact that the
latter attributed much greater significance to the commodity in question, and by de-
nying that production and consumption are distinguishable, Reddy in effect lumps
into one category traditional proletarians, house owners who are at the mercy of a
plumber, and consumers who desperately need to buy food from a merchant. Id. at
64-66, 156. This approach appears to be grounded in the author's view that market
society never existed-only market culture, which is a false ideology imposed by
market language. Wrong perceptions-especially those regarding labor as a com-
modity and denying that workers were independent or petty commodity produ-
cers-formulated by means of that language then shaped misguided practices.
William Reddy, The Rise of Market Culture: The Textile Trade and French Soci-
ety, 1750-1900 (1984).
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forms of state-enforced compulsory labor and, in the course of the
past two hundred years, has been adapted to fit the classical capi-
tal-labor relationship. This relationship is characterized by labor's
institutionalized work-site and personal subordination embodied in
its "attachment" to capital. The virtue of this test is its relative
transparency and facilitation of bright lines. Its drawback lies in
the absence of any demonstrated relevance to the way the control
test is utilized. For example, there is no reason why protection
against the insecurity of unemployment, or against the unilateral
domination inherent in atomized individual "bargaining" vis-a-vis
adhesion contracts, should be confined to workers who are closely
supervised by their employers, as opposed to those with more
work-place autonomy.76
The control test was and remains77 an appropriate standard
76. An interesting example is the nationally successful effort by taxicab compa-
nies since the 1970s to increase profits by shedding their obligations to pay employ-
ment taxes and to bargain collectively with their employees. They have achieved
this goal by creating the illusion that they have transformed their employees into
daily "lessees." As such the drivers are not even accorded the status of independ-
ent contractors, but approximate the same status as consumers renting a car from a
car rental agency. In the leading case, the federal appeals court managed to pervert
every indicium of the employer's unilateral economic power into an indicium of
self-employment. Thus, for example, the fact that the company was able to impose
on the drivers a system by which it secured the amortization and profit on its in-
vested capital before any wages were paid-by compelling them to pay the daily
lease fee before they took the cabs out-was transmogrified into a relationship
identical to that obtaining between a commercial landlord and a shopkeeper en-
abling the lessee "to produce as much income for himself as possible .. " Local
777, Democratic Union Organizing Comm., Seafarers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 603 F.2d
862, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court thereby neglects the fact that commercial land-
lords are not in, for example, the bakery business, whereas the taxicab companies
have otherwise hardly changed the way they do business at all. The very imbalance
between the organized drivers and the cab companies that gave rise to the imposi-
tion of this regime in the first place ironically also triggers the former's disqualifi-
cation as employees. Consequently, ineligible for protection under the National
Labor Relations Act, the atomized workers become powerless to halt the further
deterioration of their bargaining position. Earlier the Internal Revenue Service ap-
proved this result with respect to employment taxes. Rev. Rul. 71-572, 1971-2 C.B.
347. Subsequently the Social Security Administration adopted the same position.
SSA, Program Operations Manual System, § RS 02101.217A. & D (Nov. 1981).
Emblematic of how little progress has been achieved in consolidating a realistic
conceptual framework for the employment relationship is the fact that in the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century the chief judge of the Court of Queen's Bench was
able to see through exactly the same sham in the context of a vicarious liability
case. Even absent physical control by the owner of the hackney cab over the
driver, Lord Campbell was unwilling to be distracted by the fact that the driver
paid a fix sum to the owner and collected the fares for himself: "[M]ust not the ac-
tual arrangement between them be equally considered a mode by which the propri-
etor receives what may be estimated as the average earnings of the cab, minus a
reasonable compensation to the driver for his labour?" Powles v. Hider, 119 Eng.
Rep. 841 (Q.B. 1856).
77. Ironically, the law review literature is replete with assertions that "with the
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for the core capital-labor relations in which the employer domi-
nates the employee socio-technologically78 within the process of
production. That is where the capitalist firm owns, controls, un-
derstands and coordinates the use of all the means of production
while the worker performs a closely supervised minute task the
control test is adequate. Where the control test has become prob-
lematic is not at the core, but on the periphery.7 9 The periphery
encompasses a heterogeneous mass of work and employment rela-
tionships in which the classical model of oppressive capitalist con-
trol is less tangible at the point of performance.8 0
Precisely in response to the special situation of such "periph-
eral" workers, the economic reality of dependence test8 ' was
designed to expand the scope of employment, and has had that ef-
fect. Instead of being confined to the work place,8 2 this test exam-
advent of the large corporation-absentee ownership-employer control in any real-
istic sense almost vanished." Roscoe Steffen, "Independent Contractor and the
Good Life" 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 507 (1935). In point of fact, it was only with the
rise of mass production and Taylorism ("scientific management") that capital was
able to break the grip which skilled craft workers at one time held on numerous
production processes. See Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, (1974).
By the same token, it is incorrect to characterize as "fictitious" the control which
Blackstone and nineteenth century judges presumed the master invariably exer-
cised over his servant's activities. See, e.g., Fowler Harper, "The Basis of the Immu-
nity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor" 10 Ind. L. J. 494, 497 (1935).
Although social control was surely exercised vis-i-vis domestic and agricultural ser-
vants, production "masters," too, were typically better skilled and endowed with
more capital than the artisans working for them, and thus, in a position to domi-
nate them.
78. Although courts have confined the scope of the control test to this sphere, a
realistic conception of such physical control implies economic domination as well in
the sense that those lacking capital need an "employer." See Linder, supra note 20,
at 444.
79. Insofar as employers have grown bolder in their scams, this statement is no
longer categorically correct. The most blatant example is unskilled hand-harvest
agricultural employees, whose widespread treatment as self-employed by farmers
would-it is conjectured-scarcely have been viewed other than as a bad joke, let
alone administratively countenanced, before the 1970s.
80. The vast expansion of homework made possible by the development of
cheap micro-computers underscores the importance of conceptualizing the employ-
ment relationship so as to embrace such workers. At the high point of the federal
judiciary's openly empathetic interpretation of the humanitarian purpose of the
FLSA, it regularly held technologically backward homeworkers to be employees.
See, e.g., Walling v. American Needlecrafts, 139 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1943); Walling v.
Twyeffort, Inc., 158 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1947); McComb v. Homeworkers' Handicraft
Cooperative, 176 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1949), cert denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949); Goldberg
v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
81. Its nineteenth-century English precursor, which was molded in the context
of labor-protective statutes such as the truck acts, was rather a bright-line economic
reality of class poverty test. See Linder, supra note 20, at 444-45.
82. In its modern version--dating back to the 1940s-the economic reality of de-
pendence test subsumes the control test; in other words, it encompasses all workers
covered by the control test, which is a sub-set of the economic reality test. Hiroshi
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ines the economic subordination of the worker to the employing
entity. The test's virtue thus consists in its realistic view of the
broader scope of the class of dependent workers. Its weakness, on
the other hand, derives from its inherent lack of logical rigor. By
providing no plausible stopping point, the test potentially opens
the way to proclaiming the existence of universal dependency in
the guise of universal interdependency. Deterred as much by the
consequences of formulating a rigid binary class conflict approach
as by such open-endedness, even liberal courts have sought to
avert this outcome and the backlash that would follow-but at the
price of drawing lines that are devoid of any articulable principle.
IV. Status versus Contract
The lack of a principled position to distinguish between em-
ployers and independent contractors creates tension with attempts
to create a per se rule83 securing protection to all workers. Efforts
to create a per se rule have been motivated by the well-founded
apprehension that, absent such a rigid rule, some employers might
succeed in manipulating the legal forms of their employment con-
tracts so as to convince courts that the affected workers are in-
dependent contractors and thus not protected.8 4 Precisely why
such machinations are inconsistent with protective labor statutes
was succinctly and eloquently explained by Judge Learned Hand.
In drawing out and rejecting the implication of a defendant-coal
mining company's argument that it "is ... not in the business of
coal mining at all, in so far as it uses such miners, but is only en-
gaged in letting out contracts to independent contractors," he
noted in the workers compensation context that:
[W]hat is confessedly only a means of speeding up the miners
and their helpers becomes conveniently an incidental means of
stripping from them the protection of the statute. The labor-
ers, under this contention, are to have recourse as an employer
only to one of their own, without financial responsibility or
control of any capital; the miner is to take his chances in the
mine without the right to a safe place to work, or any other
protection except as an invited person. This misses the whole
Motomura, Employees and Independent Contractors Under the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 2 Indus. Rel. L. J. 278 (1977), noted-in a somewhat different sense-
that the two were not antithetical to each other.
83. For a detailed analysis of the cogent reasons supporting a per se rule as ap-
plied to one group of workers-namely, unskilled, hand-harvest migrant
farmworkers--see Linder, supra note 20.
84. For a rare pre-New Deal example of a court's seeing through the form to
the substance, see Robinson v. Younse Lbr. Co., 8 La. App. 160, 163 (1927) (holding
forestry workers to be employees under state workers compensation law).
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purpose of such statutes, which are meant to protect those who
are at an economic disadvantage.
It is true that the statute uses the word "employed," but
it must be understood with reference to the purpose of the act,
and where all the conditions of the relation require protection,
protection ought to be given. It is absurd to class such a miner
as an independent contractor in the only sense in which that
phrase is here relevant. He has no capital, no financial respon-
sibility. He is himself as dependent upon the conditions of his
employment as the company fixes them as are his helpers. By
him alone is carried on the company's only business; he is their
"hand," if any one is....
Such statutes are partial; they upset the freedom of con-
tract, and for ulterior purposes put the two contesting sides at
unequal advantage; they should be construed, not as theorems
of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie
behind them.8 5
By illustrating how socio-economic dependence, specific statu-
tory purpose and freedom of contract are interconnected, Hand
was able to forcefully demonstrate how statutory protection sup-
planted the common law of the employment contract. But in for-
mulating this stringently pro-worker canon of construction, Hand
reproduced the dichotomy between state intervention and employ-
ment contracts, which centuries of English jurisprudence had er-
ected and buttressed as an insurmountable barrier. Judges who
adopted a socio-economically more doctrinaire approach did not
fail to allude to the alleged moral consequences of this substitu-
tion. Thus, in construing workers' compensation statutes during
their formative period, appellate judges in Britain and the United
States8 6 tended to view them in binary terms as substituting status
for contract.8 7 For example, an English jurist stated that the
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897:
presupposes a position of dependence; it treats the class of
workmen as being in a sense "inopes consilii," and the Legisla-
ture does for them what they cannot do for themselves: it
85. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F.547, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1914), cerL
denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915).
86. British and American adjudication pertaining to labor-protective legislation
during this period fits the dichotomous formal-substantive paradigms elaborated by
P.S. Atiyah and Robert Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law
(1987).
87. The modern development and growth of industry, with the conse-
quent changes in the relation of employer and employee, have been so
profound in character and degree as to take away, in large measure,
the applicability of the doctrines upon which rest the common-law lia-
bility of the master for personal injuries to a servant .... Workmen's
Compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that
of implied contract ....
Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923).
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gives them a sort of State insurance, it being assumed that
they are either not sufficiently intelligent or not sufficiently in
funds to insure themselves.8 8
This rigidly dichotomized approach has, since the mid nine-
teenth century, generally been associated with the free-market,
contractarian rejection of the argument that "to restrain a person's
freedom of contract may be necessary to protect his freedom, that
is to protect him against oppression which he may otherwise be
constrained to impose upon himself through an act of his legally
free and socially unfree will."8 9 But its roots reach further back.
It is based, first of all, on an ambiguous use of the term "status."
As intended by Maine in his famous statement "that the move-
ment of all progressive societies has hitherto been a movement
from Status to Contract,"9 0 the term encompassed the powers and
disabilities imposed by society on individuals, without regard to
their volition, because of accidents of birth, or out of a desire to
protect wards of the state who were deemed incapable of protect-
ing themselves because of age, mental infirmity or gender.91
The social policy underlying labor-protective statutes, which
forcibly prevent the disparate degrees of bargaining power of the
parties from resulting in specific kinds of unacceptable exploita-
tion,92 is closely related to the policies which support protection of
wards (but not of differential birth rights). The crucial difference
is that modern ideas of status presuppose and operate through the
medium of the employment relationship: the existence and termi-
nation of status depend on the parties' volition, while its content is
88. Simpson v. Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron & Coal Co., [1905] 1 K.B. 453, 458 (C.A.).
89. Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law 14 (2d ed. 1977).
90. Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law 174 (1927).
91. Otto Kahn-Freund, A Note on Status and Contract in British Labour Law,
30 Mod. L. Rev. 635, 636 (1967).
92. The Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, "was a recognition of the fact
that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee, cer-
tain segments of the population required federal compulsory legislation to prevent
private contracts on their part which endangered national health and efficiency
.... .Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945). The enactment
and enforcement of minimum wage laws thus express a societal conviction that-
even absent physical coercion--certain economic agreements are unjust and hence
invalid: "The community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for un-
conscionable employers." West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
For a discussion of the morality of contractual relations, see Emile Durkheim,
Legons de Sociologie 235 (1950). Orthodox economists, while axiomatically critical
of minimum wage laws, do concede one exception-namely, where employers have
a significant degree of control over wage rates. See Stigler, The Economics of Mini-
mum Wage Legislation, 36 Am. Econ. Rev. 358, 360 (1946). To that extent it im-
pliedly approves "the prime purpose of the legislation ... to aid the unprotected,
unorganized and lowest paid of the nation's working population; that is, those em-
ployees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure for themselves a mini-
mum subsistence wage." Brooklyn Savings Bank, 324 U.S. at 707 n.18.
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partly determined by norms out of which the parties are not per-
mitted to contract, to the detriment of the weaker party.9 3
Courts conflated a relationship that can (and must) be volun-
tarily entered into and terminated, with one created without or
even against the volition of the affected parties. This result oc-
curred because nineteenth and early twentieth-century Anglo-
American jurisprudence persisted in the anachronistic and atavis-
tic tradition, codified by Blackstone, of viewing the master-servant
relationship 94 as grounded in semi-feudal and mercantilist statu-
tory compulsion and protection. With the ascendancy of the con-
tractarian mode in the nineteenth century, judges (and lawyers)
regarded both residual and nascent statutory protection of the
working class as non-market obligatory norms, totally distinct
from and operating outside of the context of the employment con-
tract.95 Unable to integrate these two dimensions of the employ-
ment relationship, status and contract, courts tended to identify
the mandatory norms as enforceable on the same grounds that ap-
plied under the Statutes of Labourers in the fourteenth century-
as effluences of status.96
By the same token, certain attenuated and socio-economically
transformed incidents of status survive as a result of the fact that
even modern wage-labor is a coercive regime:
93. Kahn-Freund, supra note 91, at 640-41.
94. At least as early as the first part of the eighteenth century social signifi-
cance attached to the distinction between a master and an employer. Thus an
anonymous author, commonly held to be Defoe, recounted the following dialogue
between a justice of the peace and a journeyman weaver:
Justice: Come in Edmund, I have talk'd with your Master- .
Edmund: Not my master, and't please your Worship, I hope I am my own
Master.
Justice: Well, your Employer, Mr. E- , the Clothier; will the word Em-
ployer do?
Edmund: Yes, yes, and't please your Worship, any thing but Master.
[Daniel Defoe], Great Law of Subordination Consider'd; or, the Insolence and Un-
sufferable Behaviour of Servants in England duly enquir'd into 97 (1724).
95. See generally, Otto Kahn-Freund, Blackstone's Neglected Chil& The Con-
tract of Employment, 93 Law Q. Rev. 508, 511-12, 524-28 (1977). Kahn-Freund,
supra note 91, at 641-42, distinguished between the English and continental legal
traditions, exempting the latter from the approach analyzed in the text. Yet the
Cour de cassation and the majority of labor law scholars in France rejected the no-
tion of economic dependence or subordination, absent express legislative instruc-
tion, precisely because it made contract interpretation hinge on an alien element-
namely, a party's social condition (i.e., status). See 2 Paul Durand, Trait6 de droit
du travail, 224-25, 242 (1950).
96. This bifurcation is rooted in the circumstance that the common law "ignores
any disequilibrium of power which results from normal social relations as distinct
from abnormal personal conditions (infancy, mental disorder). It ignores the reali-
ties of social constraint and of economic power .... Kahn-Freund, supra note 89,
at 22.
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Typically, the worker as an individual has to accept the condi-
tions which the employer offers. [T]he relation between an
employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a re-
lation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer
of power. In its inception it is an act of submission, in its oper-
ation it is a condition of subordination, however much the sub-
mission and the subordination may be concealed by the
indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the "con-
tract of employment." 97
Consequently, where workers are unable to achieve improved
working conditions and income security through direct economic
action against their immediate employers on the labor market and
at the work place, and must rely, instead, on class-wide political
action through state legislation-the protective regimes that they
do create such as minimum wages, workers compensation and un-
employment compensation-will continue to bear the stigma of
status precisely because they remain conditioned on and attached
to the existence of an employment relationship. Thus, all those in
an employment relationship will remain excluded, whether they
are alleged independent contractors or lumpen proletarians.98
V. Mapping the Borders of the Working Class
Protecting against the vicissitudes of capitalism by the crea-
tion of juridically narrowly-defined proletarian characteristics,
may have promoted the distinctive self-identity, solidarity and self-
confidence of a working class that was being forged out of hetero-
geneous strata during the nineteenth century. It may also have
encouraged the identification and alliances with the working class
that have driven progressive social change in the United States
since at least the advent of the New Deal. But now, at the end of
the twentieth century, in spite of all the talk of "bourgeoisifica-
tion" of the working class, the share of the economically active
population that can have any plausible pretension to the title of
entrepreneur is smaller than at any other time in history.99 Can it
still make sense to exclude the vulnerable from protective
97. Id. at 6.
98. The British welfare legislation of the 1940s dismantled the old three-tier
system of the independent, the paupers and the insured. See T.H. Marshall, The
Welfare State-A Comparative Study, in T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and So-
cial Development, 319 (1965).
99. The attempt by William Reddy, Money and Liberty in Modern Europe, ch. 3
(1987), to replace the concepts of class and value with that of "monetary exchange
asymmetry," may be misguided insofar as it blurs the distinction between labor ex-
changes and consumption. For example, he states "the mere difference in the rela-
tive significance of a particular commodity to each party could give the rich a
certain power over the poor." Id. at 66. It is useful, however, in emphasizing the




The difficulty in drawing a bright line between those who are
dependent and those who are independent is, according to influen-
tial sociological view, a quintessentially modern one:
In 1848 one simply knew who were the proletarians.
One knew because all the criteria-the relation to the means
of production, manual character of labor, productive employ-
ment, poverty, and degradation-all coincided to provide a con-
sistent image....
To restate the point more abstractly: in the middle of the
nineteenth century the theoretical connotation of the concept
of proletariat, defined in terms of separation from the means
of production, corresponded closely to the intuitive concept of
proletariat conceived in terms of manual, principally indus-
trial, laborers. No ambiguity had yet arisen because material
conditions closely corresponded to their theoretical
description. 10
Ambiguity arose, according to this line of thought, when
"proletarianization in the sense of separation from the means of
production" began to diverge from the other characteristics of
proletarianization.O2 This divergence was synonymous with the
subsequent explosive growth of the so-called new middle classes-
"variously termed salaried employees, white-collar workers, non-
manual workers, ouvriers intellectuels, service workers, techni-
cians." 0 3 More concretely, these hybrid proletarians include
"secretaries and executives, nurses and corporate lawyers, teachers
and policemen, computer operators and executive directors."x04
Intriguingly,105 when it is time to decide on cases (and liveli-
hoods) that turn on classifying persons as employees or self-em-
ployed, the aforementioned sociological ambiguity turns out not to
be pivotal. The advent of "the new middle classes"106 has not been
100. Thus, for example, Rep. Richard Gephardt, in campaigning for the Demo-
cratic presidential nomination, proposed that businesses be forced to provide
"health insurance to their employees, 'just as they must now provide a minimum
wage."' Observing that "'[h]ealth insurance in the modern age is just another cost
of doing business,'" he stated that it was necessary to prevent employers from
" 'passing on the cost of their employees' health care to society.'" N. Y. Times, Dec.
4, 1987, at 15, col. 5 (nat. ed.). Although this reasoning may be impeccable as far as
it goes, it does not explain why non-employees should be deprived of the same care.
101. Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, 56, 57 (1985).
102. Id. at 60.
103. Id. at 62.
104. Id. at 57.
105. That is, despite the pleas for adherence to the "methodological individual-
ism" that will create the "micro-foundations" of grand socio-economic theory of the
non-teleological functionalist variety. See, e.g., id. at 92-97; John Roemer, Divide
and Conquer: Microfoundations of the Marxian Theory of Discrimination, 10 Bell
J. Econ. 695 (1979); Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (1985).
106. Przeworski, supra note 101, at 62.
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confounding the juridical cartographers of class structure,
although in some non-trivial sense the replication of the diverging
two meanings of proletarianization continues to underlie both the
perceived need and to hamper the judicial, legislative, and admin-
istrative ability to distinguish between employees and self-em-
ployed. Instead, a remarkable continuity exists between the
disputed class positions in the mid-nineteenth century and in the
present. Even if they were self-employed, the subjects of em-
ployee status determination litigation would resemble more the
"'traditional' or 'old' middle class" of petty bourgeois non-employ-
ing self-employed producers, than they would the new middle class
of highly skilled professional wage-earners. 107 If "[t]he focal in-
quiry in the characterization process is... whether the individual
is or is not, as a matter of economic fact, in business for him-
self,"108 highly skilled wage-earners and even workers moderately
endowed with capital have rarely constituted contested terrain.
The reason is manifest. What is new about the so-called new
middle classes is that, despite being employees-"[t]hey are all
proletarians, they are all separated from the means of production
and compelled to sell their labor power for a wage"109 -they lack
the other indicia of proletarianization (manual labor, productive
employment, poverty and degradation). Consequently their for-
mal-legal status is not in question, nor are they the kinds of work-
ers pre-eminently in need of state interference with market
forces.110
In contrast, the typical grey areas of litigated disputes have
primarily encompassed a considerably more pedestrian cross-sec-
tion of occupational reality: (1) relatively unskilled manual provid-
ers of services (e.g., coal loader, janitor); (2) transportation and
storage services (e.g., drover, horse-driver, truck driver, taxicab
driver, porter, drayman, stevedore, delivery "boy"); (3) skilled and
unskilled construction, excavation and repair work (e.g., digger,
roofer, bricklayer); (4) homeworkers (e.g., lace-clipper, knitter,
silk weaver, shoemaker, tinman); and (5) a heterogeneous group of
unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled manual workers engaged in var-
ious types of labor sub-letting, sweating or piece-rate work (min-
ing, construction, logging, sharecropping, brickmaking, fishing,
107. For the typology, see Wright, What is Middle About the Middle Class? in
Analytic Marxism, 114, 126-27 (John Roemer ed. 1986).
108. Donovan v. Tehco, 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1981).
109. Przeworski, supra note 101, at 57.
110. By the same token, the classical political-economic distinction between in-
dependent commodity producers (the old middle class) and wage-laborers has also
played a distinctly marginal role in litigation.
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shipbuilding, potter printing, earthenware manufacture, meat bon-
ing, hairdressing).ii
The nub of the disputes in these cases can be reduced to two
basic issues: (1) whether the classification in question was merely a
scam perpetrated by the employer; or (2) whether the work in-
volved was sufficiently specialized and/or skilled and thus outside
the core business of the employer to qualify as independent of that
entity."i 2 Independence in this sense is not inconsistent with the
proletarian connotations of manual productive labor combined
with poverty and degradation. The fact that someone who cleans
an office at night or delivers coal to a factory may not be inte-
grated into its operation, and thus not subject to the physical con-
trol of its owners, in no way suggests that she belongs to the class
of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, which is purported to thrive on
or perish under the risks inherent in an anonymous market.
This is not to deny entirely the existence of particular self-
employed whose specialization and skill not only protect them
from succumbing to the worksite domination of their customers,ii 3
but also secure them distinctly non-proletarian remuneration.
Rarely, however, have such relationships become the subject of
employment-related litigation, because they seldom generate
problems that fall within the universe of actionable events that
traditionally have beset proletarians. But, if it is only the exist-
ence of such substantively irrelevant "counterfactual" cases that
nurtures the hypothetical vision of independence that sustains liti-
gation, then arguably the benefits of eliminating coverage disputes,
thereby reducing the economic insecurities of workers and legal
uncertainties of employers, exceed the cost of imposing protective
coverage on a relatively small group of quasi-entrepreneurs who
may not be in "urgent need" of such state interference."i 4
111. For extensive case citations describing or at least mentioning the relevant
occupations under modern protective legislation in the United States, see Annota-
tion, Determination of Employer-Employee Relationship in Social Security Contri-
bution and Unemployment, 37 A.L.R. Fed. 95 (1978) and Annotation,
Determination of "Independent Contractor" and "Employee" Status for Purposes of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 51 A.L.R. Fed. 59 (1981).
112. Support for this claim is presented in iUnder, supra note 20.
113. In this context only business entities are intended. Where households con-
tract with such skilled mechanics as plumbers, the categorical framework of the
employment relationship loses its applicability.
114. See T.H. Marshall, The Welfare State and the Affluent Society, in
T.H.Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development 292 (1965). Since, on the
other hand, exposure "to the risk of being reduced by circumstances to a state of
destitution . . . is not exactly correlated with... membership of any particular so-
cial or economic class," universal coverage would also be expedient. Id. In the
United States such a step was partially taken when the self-employed began to be
incorporated into the social security old-age pension system in the 1950s. Such
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VI. From Contract to Status to Universal Social Right
This historical perspective serves a dual purpose. First, it has
presented the transformations which the juridical distinction be-
tween servants and independent contractors has undergone in its
accommodation to radically different socio-economic and political
contexts over the past six centuries. Such a study underscores the
fact that the currently prevailing versions are neither new nor
self-explanatory. Second, it has traced the transitions from the pu-
nitive to restrictive to expansive ends that this distinction has been
designed to implement. Thus, a historical account prompts inquiry
into whether the ongoing disintegration of that distinction calls for
a reconsideration of the appropriateness of tying socio-economic
protections to the existence of an employment relationship. In
other words, rather than administering these labor-protective ben-
efits and programs through private, profit-driven employers-
whose raison d'etre is tangential if not hostile to such protec-
tions-perhaps advanced capitalist societies have accumulated suf-
ficient wealth to enable them to confer such protections on all
their members as a component of their fundamental social rights.
The most striking aspect of these various protective schemes
is how varied the coverage iS.115 This characteristic clashes with
their uniform purpose of conferring benefits on workers. No logic
or policy appears to undergird the variations. Why, for example,
should coverage be narrower under the Employers' Liability Act
or the Age Discrimination Act than under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act?
Neither the legislature nor the judiciary has given systematic
thought to the hodgepodge of definitions that clutter the threshold
to protection under these statutes. Enacted and amended piece-
meal over a period extending back into the nineteenth century,
these laws are bound to reflect the very different societal condi-
tions and Zeitgeister that gave rise to them. But they are all in
force now, when their common purpose is to intervene into the
free play of market forces shaping the conflict between the two
dominant socio-economic classes in order to impose on both certain
civilized standards. If it makes no sense, for example, for the same
worker to be an employee for the purpose of unemployment com-
pensation but not for that of workers compensation, the common
purpose would be best served by a common definition of
"employee."
supra-class coverage has the ancillary positive effect of preventing the security pro-
gram from being relegated to the status of charitable welfare.
115. See supra note 17.
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The question becomes: which definition? The control test is
the most widespread standard for coverage in legislatures and the
courts. Although some courts have advanced the economic reality
of dependence test in interpreting certain statutes, it has been on
the decline since the 1940s.
But the economic reality of dependence test does have a ra-
tional kernel, which Justice Douglas, in a lonely dissent in the
heyday of the Warren Court, articulated in the context of an anti-
trust-injunction case. Glossing the Hearst case,11 6 Douglas stated
that the Supreme Court had "pointed out that there were margi-
nal groups who, though entrepreneurial in form, lacked the bar-
gaining power necessary to obtain decent compensation, decent
hours, and decent working conditions." Especially where the for-
mally self-employed "'had no established places of business; no
employees ... ; no capital investment except a small equity in a
truck; no skill or special qualifications,'" both employees and in-
dependent contractors were "in the same boat."117
This approach recognizes that significant numbers of so-
called self-employed workers are not in a position, either in terms
of their "factor endowments" (namely, capital and skill) or of the
supply and demand of the labor market, to bargain successfully
qua individuals for the levels of compensation and the whole array
of private and public security benefits that employees have ob-
tained through either collective bargainingils or state interven-
tion.11 9 Douglas's approach could be utilized or codified by
116. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (National Labor Relations
Act intended to remedy individual worker's inequality of bargaining power even in
absence of immediate technical relationship of employer and employee).
117. Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union Local 626 v. U.S., 371 U.S. 94,
109-11 (1962). Douglas was quoting from the stipulated facts in the case. Of partic-
ular relevance in the present context is his reference to Bakery and Pastry Drivers
and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 770-71 (1942), in which bakery compa-
nies, in the wake of the advent of social security and unemployment compensation
taxes, compelled their driver-employees to become so-called independent peddlers.
In the context of federal contracts subject to the Davis-Bacon Act, it has recently
been recognized that:
Whether any business succeeds depends on a number of important fac-
tors. At the very least, however, it should not require the sacrifice of
one's labor without adequate remuneration. The obligation to pay pre-
vailing wages to all laborers ... is not mitigated or eliminated by legal
gambits which disguise a laborer or mechanic as a business enterprise.
H.R. Rep. No. 504, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988).
118. Although efforts by workers to self-organize and to bargain collectively
should reasonably constitute prima facie evidence of an employee-employer rela-
tionship, courts have nevertheless held such workers to be self-employed. See, e.g.,
Saiki v. U. S., 306 F.2d 642, 648 n.3 (8th Cir. 1962) (skilled chick sexers-absent con-
trol-not employees for employment tax purposes).
119. As formulated by the chief architect of the modern British system of social
insurance: "Many persons working on their own account are poorer and more in
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creating a category of statutory or constructive employees-that of
"dependent contractors." Models abound in the legal systems of
other societies that have sought to approximate the social condi-
tions of traditional employees and dependent contractors.120
Alternatively, irrationally invidious treatment could be elimi-
nated by, going beyond the so-called social wage, 12 1 establishing a
need of State insurance than employees ...." William Beveridge, Social Insurance
and Allied Services 4, at 6 (1942). See also, id. 118, at 53 and 314, at 126.
120. See, e.g., Ontario Labour Relations Act, § 1(1)(ga) and (gb) (1975) (defining
a dependent contractor as a person erforming work or services for another on such
terms and conditions that she is in a position of economic dependence and under an
obligation to perform duties more closely resembling an employee relationship than
that of an independent contractor, and defining "employee" to include a dependent
contractor). In the Federal Republic of Germany, "arbeiterihnliche Personen"
("employee-like persons") have secured collective bargaining and vacation rights.
Tarifvertragsgesetz § 12a (25 Aug. 1969, BGB1. I, 946). On the hybrid categories of
"dependent contractors" and "non-controlled employees" in Sweden, see Statens
Offentlga Utredningar, No. 59: Betankande med Forslag till Andrad Semesterlag-
stiftning 200-209 (1944); Statens Offentliga Utredningar, No. 14: Beroende Uppdrag-
stagare (1957); Statens Offentliga Utredningar, No. 57: Sociallagstiftningen och de
s.k. Beroende Uppdragstagarna (1961); Adlercreutz, "De s.k. beroende uppdragsta-
garna och arbetstagarbegreppets utveckling," 1956 Sociala Meddelanden 370; Folke
Schmidt, The Law of Labour Relations in Sweden, ch. 3 (1962) (written by Adler-
creutz); Axel Adlercreutz, Arbetstagarbegreppet 20, 78, passim (1964). This ap-
proach raises the question of the purpose of the significant aggregate public and
private litigation costs consumed by this exercise in line-drawing. what counter-
vailing social value is vindicated when a court determines that a would-be employee
is really an entrepreneur? If the outcome is that the injured worker will be de-
prived of some income security or in-kind medical benefit, as a consequence of
which she will become a public charge and/or a less productive worker, the result is
too shabby to merit discussion at this late date in the development of civilization.
If, however, the only issue at stake is which of the litigants' insurance account will
be charged, this is a technical problem with a technical solution. The virtual aboli-
tion of common law tort by the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 1972
merged employees and the self-employed in the category of "earners." 1 New Zea-
land Stat. § 521 (1972). See also Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity: A
Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and Australia (1979).
121. Exactly what the social wage encompasses has confused even such an astute
left-wing critic as Samuel Bowles, who asserts that in the U.S. in 1979 twenty-nine
per cent "of the standard of living of workers is acquired through the exercise of
citizen rights rather than through the exchange of labor power for a wage." Sa-
muel Bowles, The Post-Keynesian Capital-Labor Stalemate, 12 No. 5 [No. 65] Social-
ist Rev. 45, 52-53 (1982). See also John Myles, Old Age in the Welfare State (1984).
In point of fact, the vast bulk of the components of the social wage is tied to the
existence of an employment relationship and no entitlement to them exists as a
right of mere citizenship. An examination of the results of a detailed and careful
reworking of the data for 1980 indicates that even the less than one-tenth of 390
billion dollars comprising the so-called secondary consumer income cash benefits
receipt of which was not so tied was largely subject to means-testing (e.g., Supple-
mental Security income for the aged, blind, and disabled, AFDC, and general assist-
ance) rather than classifiable as entitlements of citizenship. See Robert Lampman,
Social Welfare Spending, Table A.1 at 175-77 (1984). Medicaid accounted for ca.
one-sixth of the corresponding health benefits. Id. Table A.2 at 178-79. Only in the
area of in-kind food and housing and other benefits did general poor-law type of
benefits (such as food stamps) account for more than one-quarter of the total bene-
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universal entitlement to various benefits and protections, 22 which
would be uncoupled from the employment relationship.123 A
number of Western European countries have already achieved this
end with respect to health, invalidity, old-age and maternity bene-
fits.124 Such an approach would euthanize, for practical purposes,
the independent contractor problem. At the same time, the
universality of a guaranteed basic income 12 5 would remove the
stigma of passive dependency that has always attached to the re-
ceipt of quasi-charitable welfare. Recipients would be no more
stigmatized than those who currently are entitled to state funded
and organized education.126 Rather than constituting a dilution of
the working class, such a system, combined with a program of
community-building public works that could provide useful and
therefore meaningful work for all those whom capital cannot em-
ploy, 127 would be a step towards creating a society in which social
fits. Id. Table A.4 at 181. Since much of this income flow serves to support chil-
dren, it is questionable whether it should be classified as part of the social wage.
122. This proposal does not pre-judge the method of financing.
123. Britain already accomplished this uncoupling in the original Old Age Pen-
sions Act, 8 Edw. 7, c. 40 §§ 1-2 (1908), although it re-introduced the tie to an em-
ployment relationship in the National Health Insurance Act, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55,
part I, § 1 (1911).
124. Within the European Community, Denmark has been a leader in this re-
gard; the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy have also taken significant
steps. For an overview, see Commission of the European Communities, Compara-
tive Tables of the Social Security Schemes in the Member States of the European
Communities (13th ed. 1985). The Scandinavian countries have also incorporated
the self-employed into the unemployment insurance system. See also Council of
Europe, Comparative Tables of the Social Security System in Council of Europe
member states not belonging to the European Communities (2d ed. 1985).
125. See, e.g., Andr6 Gorz, Les Chemins du paradis 91-92 (1983). For a discussion
from the distinctive perspective of poor-law-like welfare stigmatization, see Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, Should the Federal Government Guarantee a Minimum
Cash Income to All Citizens? (1967). On the conservative origins of the negative
income tax, see Booker, Lady Rhys Williams' Proposals for the Amalgamation of
Direct Taxation with Social Insurance, 56 Econ. J. 230 (1946); Lady [Juliette] Rhys-
Williams, Taxation and Incentives (1953).
126. See Dwight McDonald, Our Invisible Poor, 38 The New Yorker 82, 131 (Jan.
19, 1963).
127. Although a vital truth lies in the argument that a society as wealthy as the
United States needs less work rather than more, it is only a partial truth, which,
when presented absolutely, effectively propagates demoralization. See, e.g., Fred
Block, Rethinking the Political Economy of the Welfare State, in Fred Block, Rich-
ard A. Cloward, Barbara Ehrenreich & Frances Fox Piven, The Mean Season 109,
134 (1987). That is to say, it may be true that a reorganization of production and a
redistribution of income could sustain the current standard of living with a shorter
work week. By the same token, that standard of living, particularly with regard to
the quality of housing, health, child care, the environment and mass transportation,
is so inadequate that the work required to raise it to acceptable levels would pre-
sumably occupy several generations. But see Kesselman, Work Relief Programs in
the Great Depression, Creating Jobs: Public Employment Programs and Wage Sub-
sidies 153, 222 nn.236 & 237 (John Palmer ed. 1978). Finally, the notion that those
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and labor law would coalesce because the right to socially useful
work and to adequate income and security would be emphatically
linked.128
Finally, a guaranteed income would corrode the coercive
character of the labor market. By undermining the need to sell la-
bor power under any and all circumstances, it would make possible
a qualitatively different range of choices to a society of signifi-
cantly more autonomous individuals.129 The resulting democratic
restructuring of capital-labor relations would also contribute to
subverting the dichotomous domains of freedom and unfreedom
underlying the original Roman-law distinction between independ-
ent contractors and servants. 3 0
who have been discriminatorily shut out from income-generating work should be
relegated to the role of welfare consumers in perpetuity is calculated to consolidate
the existence of a divisive lumpen proletariat. This position must be distinguished
from the authoritarian-restorationist lamentations embodied in Lawrence Mead,
Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (1986).
128. From the perspective of Jiurgen Habermas, such a "step would be revolu-
tionary, but not revolutionary enough." Habermas, Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates
und die Erschopfung utopischer Energien, in Habermas, Die Neue UnUbersich-
tlichkeit 141, 157-62 (1985) (originally delivered as a speech before the Spanish Par-
liament in 1984).
129. This theme was developed by many of the contributors to The Guaranteed
Income (Robert Theobald ed. 1965). See also Krouse & McPherson, Capitalism,
"Property-Owning Democracy," and the Welfare State, in Democracy and the Wel-
fare State, 79, 91 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1988). On the surprisingly small negative im-
pact of an experimental negative income tax on the supply of labor, see Work
Incentives and Income Guarantees: The New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experi-
ment (Joseph Pechman and P. Michael Timpane ed. 1975); Burtless, The Work Re-
sponse to a Guaranteed Income: A Survey of Experimental Evidence, in Lessons
from the Income Maintenance Experiments 22, Table 2, at 26 (Alice Munnell ed.
1986).
130. On this distinction between locatio conductio operis and locatio conductio
operarum, see 2 Francis de Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius: Commentary 170-72
(1953); Francesco De Robertis, Lavoro e lavoratori nel mundo romano (1963); iUn-
der supra note 20, at 441-42.
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